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I. INTRODUCTION
“Just as it is axiomatic that hard cases make bad law, so it is also true that
difficult social issues often provoke ill considered and unsound legislative
proposals.”1
She was wearing a billowy shirt with a flowery pattern on it underneath a fringed,
suede vest.  Her jeans had colorful patches on the knees. On her head sat an
oversized, floppy tam hat.  Her long, wispy hair flowed out from underneath it.  I
could barely see her eyes. She stopped me as I was walking out of the supermarket
laden with kids and groceries.
“Are you a registered voter?” She inquired.  After I nodded my head, she added,
“Do you live in Cuyahoga County?”
“Yes,” I replied matter-of-factly.  I knew what her third question would be.
1David Westfall, Beyond Abortion: The Potential Reach of a Human Life Amendment, 8 
AM. J. L. & MED. 97 (1982). 
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“Would you sign this petition?”  Bingo!   
“We are trying to reduce the state’s spending on prisons by getting drug 
treatment for people who need it.  Right now the state spends $23,000 a year per 
person in prison and many of those people need treatment rather than jail time.  
Treatment would cost only $4,000 per year.  This state is putting thousands of people 
in overcrowded jails for simply being in possession of marijuana.  They don’t belong 
in jail; they need treatment.  It would be better for these people and the state’s budget 
if they got treatment instead of jail time.”2  I signed the petition because: (1) I 
actually agreed with her; (2) at one point in time, I worked in a drug treatment 
program and am an advocate for such programs; and (3) I thought it would be better 
to put the issue to a vote rather than let it get defeated before people actually heard 
about it. 
In the summer of 2002, proponents of Issue 1 “The Ohio Drug Treatment 
Initiative,” (hereafter referred to as the Initiative) succeeded in getting the proposal 
on the November ballot. 3   The Initiative proposed an amendment to the Ohio 
Constitution that would have required courts to approve requests for treatment when 
made by eligible nonviolent drug offenders.4  The Amendment sought to (1) allocate 
a fixed amount of the state’s General Revenue Fund to pay for the opening and 
operating of new treatment centers, 5  (2) limit prison sentences for users and 
possessors to ninety days,6 and (3) provide for the sealing and expungement of 
records for those offenders who completed treatment.7
The Initiative sparked a “war on drugs” debate that was a major focus of the 
November 2002 gubernatorial race.  Republican incumbent, Governor Bob Taft, was 
vocally against the issue, while Democratic candidate, Tim Hagan, argued the issue’s 
merits.  The Initiative was defeated 66.92% “No” to 33.08% “Yes.”8
A similar debate occurred when the 1989 administration of President George 
Bush announced its “war on drugs.” “A strange bedfellow’s coalition of liberal and 
conservative critics argued that the plan relied too heavily on interdicting foreign 
supplies and incarcerating petty traffickers, tactics they viewed as failed, futile and a 
                                                                
2This is not the petitioner’s exact wording.  The quotation marks have been added for 
visual effect. 
3See Secretary of State, Proposed Constitutional Amendments, Initiated Legislation, and 
Law Challenged by Referendum, Submitted to the Electors, at
http://serform.sos.state.oh.us/sos/results/many/isshist.pdf (last revisited on Jan. 17, 2004) (on 
file with author). 
4 See ISSUE 1: THE OHIO DRUG TREATMENT INITIATIVE, at
http://serform.sos.state.oh.us/sos/results/index.html (last revisited on Jan. 17, 2004) (on file 
with author). 
5See INITIATIVE, infra note, 116. 
6See INITIATIVE, infra note, 112. 
7See INITIATIVE, infra note, 115. 
8 Secretary of State, Official Election Results for November 5, 2002, at
http://serform.sos.state.oh.us/sos/results/index.html (last revisited Jan. 17, 2004) (on file with 
author).
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threat to civil freedoms.”9  Many members of Congress charged that the plan put too 
much emphasis on anti-drug law enforcement and not enough emphasis on drug 
abuse prevention and treatment.10  They also insisted that the plan was terribly under 
funded.11  Over a decade later, the same arguments are being made.12  With so much 
emphasis being placed on the need for treatment and prevention why did Ohioans 
reject The Ohio Drug Treatment Initiative? 
This note seeks to answer this complicated question.  Section II summarizes the 
Initiative power, how it came to be, and how it has been used in Ohio.  Section III 
describes the Initiative in detail and explains current statutes that provide for 
treatment in lieu of incarceration.  The final section analyzes why the Initiative failed 
and suggests some likely consequences had the Initiative been ratified.   
II. A HISTORY OF THE INITIATIVE POWER
Direct democracy refers to the powers that allow citizens to create laws without 
the action of the elected legislators.  These powers are embedded in many state 
                                                                
9 Henry J. Aaron & Charles L. Schultze, ed., Setting Domestic Priorities: What can 
Government do?, 112, (1992) (citing White House, National Drug Control Strategy (GPO, 
Sept. 1989)).  See also, Noam Chomsky, Interviewed by David Barsamian, The Common 
Good, 35 (1998).  “The utterly fraudulent war on drugs was undertaken at a time when 
everyone knew that the use of every drug – even coffee – was falling among educated whites, 
and was staying sort of level among blacks.  The police find it much easier to make an arrest 
on the streets of a black ghetto than in a white suburb.  By now, a very high percentage of 
incarceration is drug related, and it mostly targets little guys, somebody who’s caught 
peddling dope.”  Id.
10See Aaron, supra note 9, at 112.  Critics of the “war on drugs” have made several 
primary arguments: (1) many prisoners can be diverted into certain types of community-based 
supervision programs without a significant threat to public safety and with significant savings 
in public money; (2) a majority of the public when properly informed, supports a greater use 
of community based programs for offenders; and (3) imprisonment rates and crime rates do 
not vary inversely.  Id. at 117. 
11Id.
12 See generally David C. Leven, Our Drug Laws Have Failed – So Where is the 
Desparately Needed Meaningful Reform? 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 293, (2000); Margaret P. 
Spencer, The Sentencing Controversy: Punishment and Policy in the War Against Drugs: 
Sentencing Drug Offenders:  The Incarceration Addiction, 40 VILL. L. REV. 335 (1995).  See
also Winning the War on Drugs: A “Second Chance” for Nonviolent Drug Offenders, 113 
HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1492-93 (2000).  Sandy Theis, Issue 1’s Drug Treatment has Experts on 
Both Sides, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 20, 2002, at S4 (stating that most people agree that 
more treatment programs are needed). 
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constitutions, including the Ohio Constitution.13  They are commonly known as the 
initiative and the referendum powers.14
Advocates of direct democracy argue that if people are intelligent enough to vote 
on a candidate, they are equally competent to vote on issues.15  “It is far easier for 
people to make wise decisions on issues than on the shifting personalities and 
promises of individuals.”16  Critics of direct democracy argue that voter apathy and 
confusion on issues result in incompetent voters deciding critical issues.  “[P]eople 
are not informed or caring enough to vote on complicated public policy issues.  Too 
many would not understand technical issues.  Too many would simply be confused, 
and not enough would actually vote.  The quality of our laws and constitutions would 
suffer.”17
Because the initiative is granted by state constitutions, only a constitutional 
amendment can remove it.  All constitutional amendments must be submitted to the 
people for ratification.  It is unlikely that citizens would surrender the initiative 
power and invest so much strength in the hands of the legislators.  
A.  The History of Initiatives in the United States 
The late nineteenth century saw a great concern with the proper functioning of 
state governments.18
Public mistrust of state legislatures was considerable in the 1890s and at 
the turn of the century. . . . Thus a major premise underlying their 
campaign for the initiative and referendum was that representative 
government had failed to live up to expectation. . . . Citizens were 
increasingly convinced that powerful, organized, self-seeking interests 
shaped legislative outcomes at the expense of the public interest.19
                                                                
13See ALASKA CONST. art XI; ARIZ. CONST. art IV, pt. 1, § 1(2); ARK. CONST. VII; CAL.
CONST. art. II, § 8; COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1; D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-282 (1992); FLA. CONST.
art. XI, § 3; IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3; ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, 
§ 18; MASS. CONST. amend. art. XLVIII; MICH. CONST. art. II, § 9, art. XII, § 2; MISS. CONST.
art. 15, § 273; MO. CONST. art. III, § 49; MONT. CONST. art. III, § 4, XIV, § 9; NEB. CONST. art. 
III, §§ 1, 2; NEV. CONST. art. XIX, § 2; N.D. CONST. art. III, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. II, §§ 1a, b; 
OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 1; OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1; S.D. CONST. art. III, § 1, art. XXIII, § 1; 
UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. 3, § 52. 
14See id.  The initiative is a process where citizens gather enough signatures in support of a 
proposed law to place it on the ballot at the next election.  If a majority of voters approve the 
measure, it becomes law.  A referendum is the process where citizens can block a law 
approved by the General Assembly from taking effect.  Id.
15THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM AND 
RECALL, 61 (1989). 
16Id. (quoting Chip Dent, testimony in New York State Legislature, Public Hearings of the 
Subcommittee on Initiative and Referendum (Albany: State of New York, 1979) at p. 102). 
17CRONIN, supra note 15, at 61. 
18See Richard A. Chesley, The Current Use of the Initiative and Referendum in Ohio and 
other States, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 541, 544 (1984).   
19See CRONIN, supra note 15.
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As a result of this concern, a trend developed toward curbing the state legislative 
power.20  The Progressive Party21 viewed the initiative and referendum as a way to 
curb that power and assure the people of an opportunity to directly participate in the 
enactment of laws and amendments.22  State constitutions were seen as the best tool 
to accomplish this opportunity.23
In the early twentieth century, the Progressive Party argued that direct legislation 
would be beneficial.24  The initiative process would “result in increased government 
responsiveness to the will of the people, greater citizen participation and a better-
informed electorate.”25  It would force officials to face the true issues of the people 
and stop the tendency to not rock the boat.26  The Party argued that because the 
people are sovereign, they merely delegated their power to the elected officials rather 
than relinquished it.27
Two primary assumptions led to the establishment of the initiative process in the 
United States.28  First, because the common man was disassociated from all special 
interests and biases and was only motivated by the desire to improve society, it was 
assumed that he would rule well.29  The second assumption was that special interest 
groups, political parties and even popularly elected officials could easily be bought, 
resulting in laws created not for the good of the people, but for the good of special 
interest groups.30
Supporters of the initiative process argued that public forums would provide in-
depth discussions about the issues and thereby ensure honesty in government and 
cause voters to be less apathetic.31  Initiative power would provide a check for the 
legislative power by allowing citizens to overrule their elected officials without 
removing them from office.32  The initiative power now helps curb problems with the 
legislature including, but not limited to: campaign spending, unequal lobbying and 
                                                                
20See CHESLEY, supra note 18, at 544. 
21A short-lived, minor political party in the Progressive Era. 
22 See OHIO CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION COMMISSION, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
AMENDMENTS TO THE OHIO CONSTITUTION, 485 (1977). 
23See CHESLEY, supra note 18, at 544. 
24Id. at 4.  
25 DAVID D. SCHMIDT, CITIZEN LAWMAKERS: THE BALLOT INITIATIVE REVOLUTION, 25 
(1989).
26TEXAS GOVERNMENTAL COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, INITIATIVE 
AND REFERENDUM: AN INFORMATIONAL REPORT, NO. VII-2, 1979, at 3.  
27Id.
28 See COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 26, at 3. 
29Id.
30See id. This second assumption became a major focus of the opposition to the Initiative 
who stated that it was special interest groups that led the proponent force. 
31Id.
32Id.
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off year contributions, gerrymandering, logrolling, unrepresentative 
representatives,33 and legislators’ arrogance.34
There were and are several drawbacks to and arguments against the initiative 
process.  Some critics argue that the initiative process is alien to the spirit of the 
United States Constitution.  They propose that millionaires and interest groups use 
this tool to achieve their own policy objectives.35  Others complain that the system 
creates dual lawmaking bodies, encourages legislators to do nothing because the 
people will act when they want a change, and threatens to override the voice of the 
majority that is inherent in elected officials.36  Opponents also assert that voters 
cannot be competent lawmakers because they are unable to understand all of the 
issues that they are voting on and will not have the benefit of the high-level debates 
that occur in legislative lawmaking.37  While these arguments have some validity, the 
initiative process is here to stay.  
Once in place, the initiative power was infrequently used by people of the states 
until the famous Proposition 1338 secured a place on the 1973 California ballot and 
won the majority of votes.39  After Proposition 13 won, citizens in many other states 
began proposing initiatives dealing with tax issues which legislative bodies had 
already voted down.40  The initiative also gained popularity in Ohio.41  In order to 
better understand the initiative process in Ohio, an in depth look at the Ohio 
Constitution should be made. 
                                                                
33See SCHMIDT, supra note 25, at 32.  Most elected officials are white, middle-aged male 
attorneys.  Despite increases in the number of women and minority representatives, the 
legislatures do not reflect the makeup of the general population.  Id.
34Id. at 30–33. 
35DAVID S. BRODER, DEMOCRACY DERAILED: INITIATIVE CAMPAIGNS AND THE POWER OF 
MONEY, 1 (2000).  “Government by initiative is not only a radical departure from the 
Constitution’s system of checks and balances, it is also a big business, in which lawyers and 
campaign consultants, signature-gathering firms and other players sell their services to affluent 
interest groups of millionaire do-gooders with private policy and political agendas.  These 
players—often not even residents of the states whose laws and constitutions they are 
rewriting—have learned that the initiative is a far more efficient way of achieving their ends 
than the cumbersome process of supporting candidates for public office and then lobbying 
them to pass or sign the measures they seek.”  Id. at 5. 
36Id.
37Id.
38California’s Proposition 13 was a 1973 controversial tax cut initiative, which slashed 
taxes by at least half.  More voters voted on this issue than the gubernatorial race held the 
same day.  See CRONIN, supra note 15, at 3.  
39See JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, THE INITIATIVE: CITIZEN LAW-MAKING, 105 (1999). 
40See id. at 106. 
41 After 1973, Ohioans proposed 31 laws and constitutional amendments through the 
initiative process.  Secretary of State, Kenneth Blackwell, Past Election Results, at
http://www.state.oh.us/sos/election_results.htm (last revisited Jan. 17, 2004).   
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B.  The Ohio Constitution 
The Ohio Constitution was originally ratified in 1802 as Ohio was seeking to 
gain admission into the Union.  The people of the territory pressed Congress to 
approve a constitutional convention to allow representatives to write a preliminary 
state constitution. 42   “The 1802 Constitution evinces a strong reaction to the 
executive autocracy that prevailed under the Ordinance of 1787, and touched off an 
era of legislative dominance.”43  This undesirable era of legislative dominance led to 
the Constitutional Convention of 1851 and the adoption of Ohio’s second 
constitution.44   Today, this new Constitution, with amendments, remains as the 
fundamental law of Ohio.45
The General Assembly could amend the 1851 Constitution through a joint 
resolution.  The Constitution mandated that any proposed amendment required 
approval by three-fifths of each house prior to submission to the people for their 
approval.46  Because the 1851 Constitution needed major revision, a Constitutional 
Convention was again held in 1912.47  The initiative and referendum, significant 
alterations adopted at the 1912 convention, gave people more direct legislative 
power.48  The initiative enabled amendment to the Constitution through citizen-
initiated proposals.49  The initiative “is a method whereby the people propose an 
                                                                
42See The State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 86 Ohio St. 3d 451, 
462 (1999). 
43Id. at 463. 
44Id. at 465. 
45See 124 LSC MEMBERS’ BRIEF: HOW TO APPROACH THE OHIO CONSTITUTION, 1 (Issue 
12, November 8, 2002).  “The Ohio Constitution is a document of independent force.”  Arnold 
v. Cleveland, 67 Ohio St.3d 35 (1993). 
46“Either branch of the General Assembly may propose amendments to this constitution; 
and, if the same shall be agreed to by three-fifths of the members elected to each house, such 
proposed amendments shall be entered on the journals, with the yeas and nays, and shall be 
filed with the secretary of state at least ninety days before the date of the election at which 
they are to be submitted to the electors, for their approval or rejection. . . .  Such proposed 
amendments, the ballot language, the explanations, and the arguments, if any, shall be 
published once a week for three consecutive weeks preceding such election, in at least one 
newspaper of general circulation in each county of the state, where a newspaper is published. 
. . .  If the majority of the electors voting on the same shall adopt such amendments the same 
shall become a part of the constitution.” OHIO CONST. art. XVI, § 1. 
47This convention has been known as the single greatest event in the political evolution of 
Ohio.  See CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION COMMISSION, supra note 22, at 485.  The delegates to 
the 1912 convention agreed that the framers of the 1851 Constitution made the document too 
difficult to amend. Id. at 91.  They submitted forty-one separate amendments to the voters and 
thirty-three were approved.  Id.
48“The initiative and referendum have been treated as separable institutions, with the 
former considered a ‘condition precedent’ to the later.”  See CHESLEY, supra note 18, at 544.  
This article will not discuss details of the referendum power. 
49Id. See OHIO CONST. art II, § 1a.  “The first aforestated power reserved by the people is 
designated the initiative, and the signatures of ten per centum of the electors shall be required 
upon a petition to propose an amendment to the constitution. When a petition signed by the 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2004
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amendment by petition; their proposal appears on the ballot, and if a majority votes 
favorably, the proposal becomes an amendment to the constitution.50  No action by 
the General Assembly is involved.”51  The people may also use the initiative to 
effectuate a statute by proposing a law to the General Assembly.52
The initiative resulted in an increase in both the number of constitutional 
amendments submitted to the people for ratification and the number adopted since 
1912. 53   By 1920, fourteen citizen-initiated amendments were submitted to the 
people.54  Four of these were adopted.55  While the number of initiative petitions 
decreased thereafter, the submission of constitutional amendments proposed by the 
General Assembly increased substantially.56
Although challenged several times since its enactment in 1912, the initiative 
process has not changed.  The language of the amendment, its placement in the 
constitution and the procedures outlining the initiative process have been questioned 
several times.  In 1939, voters rejected a proposed constitutional amendment that 
would have changed the requirements necessary to qualify an initiative petition.57  In 
1976, another proposal was placed before the people seeking to simplify the 
procedures for initiative and referendum.  The measure failed by a vote of more than 
two-to-one.58  In 1977, The Ohio Constitutional Revision Commission suggested that 
the initiative and referendum be repealed from Article II.59  It proposed that the two 
processes should be more clearly spelled out in a separate location, Article XIV.60
                                                          
aforesaid required number of electors, shall have been filed with the secretary of state, and 
verified as herein provided, proposing an amendment to the constitution, the full text of which 
shall have been set forth in such petition, the secretary of state shall submit for the approval or 
rejection of the electors, the proposed amendment, in the manner hereinafter provided, at the 
next succeeding regular or general election in any year occurring subsequent to ninety days 
after the filing of such petition.”  Id.
50Now the Constitution may be amended in three ways: by Constitutional Convention, 
initiative or joint resolution.  All methods require that the amendment be submitted to the 
citizens for vote.  See id.  The requirements and prohibitions of the constitution were enacted 
to “save the people from the consequences of their impulses, while the provisions for its 
orderly amendment would enable them to give effect to their deliberately formed opinions.”  
State ex rel. Karlinger v. Bd. of Deputy State Sup'rs of Elections, 80 Ohio St. 471, 491-92 
(1909) (overruled in part on other grounds). 
51See SECRETARY OF STATE, supra note 3.
52See OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1b. 
53See CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION COMMISSION, supra note 22, at 485. 
54Id.
55Id.
56Id.
57See SECRETARY OF STATE, supra note 3. 
58Id.
59See CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION COMMISSION, supra note 22, at 349.  The Commission 
also suggested other changes to the initiative process including requiring a fixed number of 
signatures to gain access on the ballot.  None of the changes were adopted.  Id.
60Id. at 349. 
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The Commission argued that a revision in the language and placement would make 
the initiative and referendum processes clearer and more understandable. 61
However, this structural change to the Constitution has not yet been approved.62  The 
initiave process remains the most direct form of democracy available to the people, 
as it provides the ability to change the state’s laws through direct vote. 
C.  The History of Initiatives in Ohio 
There are two basic forms to the initiative process: the direct initiative and the 
indirect initiative. 63   The Ohio Constitution establishes direct initiatives for 
Constitutional amendments and indirect initiatives for statutes.64  The methods are 
not interchangeable.65
A direct initiative is a proposed constitutional amendment that qualifies for the 
ballot by citizen petition and is submitted directly to the people for a vote.66  For an 
indirect initiative, the proposed statute must be submitted to the legislature first.67  If 
the legislature decides to adopt the law, there is no need to submit it to the people.68
If the legislature modifies the statute, declines to accept it, or does not act on it 
within four months, the citizens must gather more signatures to place the proposal on 
the next ballot for a vote by the people.69
Proponents of a proposed initiative generally dislike the indirect initiative, and 
when given a choice, most opt for the direct initiative.70  “Eighty-five percent of the 
                                                                
61Id.
62See generally OHIO CONST. art. II § 1, art. XIV. 
63PHILIP L. DUBOIS & FLOYD FEENEY, LAWMAKING BY INITIATIVE: ISSUES, OPTIONS AND 
COMPARISONS, 27 (1998). 
64See OHIO CONST. art. II, §§ 1a (constitutional amendments), 1b (statutes). 
65Id.  Ohio is one of five states that require proponents of statutory initiatives to submit all 
proposals to the legislature for consideration.  See DUBOIS at 85.  Maine, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Nevada, and Ohio comprise this group.  Ohio, Michigan and Nevada are the only 
three states that have direct initiative for constitutional amendments and indirect initiative for 
statutes.  See id. at 87. 
66See DUBOIS, supra note 63, at 27. 
67Id.  To send an initiative to the General Assembly the proponents must gather signatures 
totaling 3% of votes cast in the last gubernatorial election.  Gatherers must have signatures 
from each county.  See OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1b. 
68See DUBOIS, supra note 63, at 27. 
69See OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1b.  “If it shall not be passed, or if it shall be passed in an 
amended form, or if no action shall be taken thereon within four months from the time it is 
received by the general assembly, it shall be submitted by the secretary of state to the electors 
for their approval or rejection at the next regular or general election, if such submission shall 
be demanded by supplementary petition verified as herein provided and signed by not less 
than three per centum of the electors in addition to those signing the original petition . . . .”  Id.
Unhappy proponents can collect signatures equal to an additional 3% to get the proposal to 
appear on the next ballot.  Together the number of signatures must be at least 6%; 3% to put it 
before the legislature and then 3% more to put it before the people.  See id.
70See DUBOIS, supra note 63, at 87. 
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proponents who have been successful in getting an initiative on the ballot have 
chosen to use the direct initiative.” 71   This has lead to a large number of 
constitutional amendment proposals.  Many, perhaps most, of these proposals should 
have been statutes. 
Proponents prefer direct initiatives for several reasons.  One reason may be that 
they have failed to initially persuade the legislature to pass measures reflecting their 
proposals.  They see little benefit in going back to the legislature for another go-
around as an indirect initiative.  Another reason is that grass-roots organizations rely 
heavily on initiatives to get their message heard.72   The delays associated with the 
legislative process are especially burdensome on the resources of these groups 
making indirect initiatives unattractive.  However, the most important reason for 
choosing the direct initiative may be that it “does not require compromise [with the 
General Assembly] and allows a proponent to put exactly what they [sic] want before 
the voters.”73  “Undoubtedly one reason for selecting the direct initiative in these 
states is the greater immunity to legislative change that constitutional amendments 
provide for the proponents’ proposals.”74
Direct initiatives do have downsides.  If a measure is submitted as a direct 
initiative, the proposal cannot be changed once it has been accepted for circulation to 
gather signatures.75  The initiative and its summary, which will be placed on the 
ballot, must be in the exact form as the proposal used for signature gathering.  There 
is no opportunity to alter the proposal to include public response, improve drafting, 
or adjust policy concerns.  A seemingly minor flaw in wording can become a 
significant focus for opponents.  More importantly any flaw could also lessen the 
effectiveness of the proposal if it passes.76
According to the Secretary of State, from 1912 – 1997 there were fifty 
constitutional amendment initiatives and nine statutory initiatives proposed in 
Ohio.77  The electors approved only fourteen amendments and two laws.78  Of the 
amendments that passed, only one involved a greatly debated social policy, the 
national prohibition on alcohol.79  It was repealed thirteen years later.80  Those that 
failed pertained to gambling, environmental issues, controversial taxes, voting, 
employment and schools.81  Ohioans favored changes to the Ohio Constitution that 
                                                                
71Id.
72Id.
73Id.
74Id.
75One argument against allowing revision of an initiative after it has begun to circulate is 
that those who have already signed the proposal might not have signed it if it had circulated in 
its amended form.  Id. at 117.  See DUBOIS, supra note 63, at 27. 
76See SCHMIDT, supra note 25.
77See SECRETARY OF STATE, supra note 3.
78Id.
79See id.
80Id.
81Id.
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were general in nature, affected a majority of citizens favorably, and were 
fundamental to their way of life.  
The Ohio Legislative Service Commission maintains that the changes to the Ohio 
Constitution in the past 200 years have yielded a succinct, general document that 
lays the foundations for all laws which govern our behavior.82  However, Ohioans 
have expressed concern over the constitution becoming too cluttered.83  Because the 
constitution is a conglomeration of past General Assembly and initiative reform 
measures, it seems far from succinct.   
Ohioans have indicated that constitutional amendments that raise moral dilemmas 
will not be considered lightly.84  The Drug Treatment Initiative has itself sparked 
moral debates.  Opponents to the Initiative claimed that it was a step toward 
legalizing drugs.85  Proponents of the measure indicated that differences in drug 
sentencing for possession of crack and cocaine have lead to a huge discrepancy in 
the amount of blacks and whites in prison.86
The Ohio Constitution is an educational document that says a lot about the 
history, politics, and values of the state.87    State constitutions “summarize the 
collected experiences of the American people and apply them to a single 
commonwealth’s circumstances.  Most of all, they are a people’s basic notions about 
who they are, how they choose to rule themselves, and what values they wish to hand 
                                                                
82See LSC MEMBERS’ BRIEF, supra note 45, at 3.   “Some provisions of the Constitution 
are broadly philosophical, while others are narrowly drawn.  Some are short, manageable 
sections with the characteristics of fundamental law, while others are long and detailed with 
the characteristics of statutory law. Older sections may have long, unlettered paragraphs and 
language that reflects a long-past historical context; more recently adopted sections generally 
conform to LSC drafting standards and use modern terminology.  Some provisions are limited 
to one principle or rule of law; others contain several principles or rules of law.” Id.
83Ohio State Medical Association, State Issue 1: The Ohio Drug Treatment Initiative, at
http://www.osma.org/legislation/state-issue-1.cfm (last visited Jan. 17, 2004) (on file with 
author).
84The Catholic Church provided a list of guiding questions for issues of great moral 
question when the constitutional amendment initiative for casino gambling was put before the 
voters. See Catholic Conference of Ohio, Statement on the Establishment of Riverboat Casino 
Gambling in Ohio, at http://www.cdeducation.org/cco/bs/riverboatgambling.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 17, 2004) (on file with author). 
85See Glenn Scheller, Issue 1 aims to Nudge Ohio Toward Drug Legalization, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, October 20, 2002, at B5 (claiming that proponents know a drug legalization 
measure would fail and have used this initiative as a disguised effort to further their goal); 
Alan Johnson, Taft Upsets Issue 1 Backers, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 15, 2002, at B1 
(voicing suspicions that the Initiative is a first step in legalization because the proponent 
supports medical use of marijuana). 
86See Alan Johnson, Some Looking Beyond Issue 1 Campaign: Activists seek equality in 
sentencing, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 1, 2002, at C8 (quoting national studies that indicate 
while drug use among blacks and whites is about the same, blacks account for 35% of drug 
arrests, and 74% of convictions); Olivia Perkins, Drug War Fuels Black Support for Issue 1,
PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 31, 2002, at B1 (stating that issue 1 is a civil rights issue because of the 
disproportionate number of blacks who have been affected by mandatory sentencing laws). 
87See LSC MEMBERS’ BRIEF, supra note 45, at 6. 
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down to the next generation.”88  The Initiative was too far removed from the values 
and beliefs of Ohioans today. 
III. AN OVERVIEW OF THE OHIO DRUG TREATMENT INITIATIVE
The Initiative failed to gain the majority of votes at the November 5, 2002 
election.89  Its title was “To amend Art. IV of the Ohio Constitution by adding a 
Section 24 to provide for treatment in lieu of incarceration for persons charged with 
or convicted of illegal possession or use of a controlled substance in certain limited 
circumstances.”90
The coalition “Ohioans for New Drug Policies” was the main proponent for the 
Initiative.  Dissatisfied with the failing “war or drugs,” three wealthy men backed the 
coalition and set out to change the policy of drug treatment in Ohio.  The men, 
George Soros, Peter Lewis, and John Sperling, had earlier founded a similar national 
coalition named “The Campaign for New Drug Policies.”   
In their past efforts, these primary supporters of the Initiative formed an 
organization called Californians for Medical Rights in 1996.91  In California, they 
financed a successful initiative that legalized prescription medical marijuana.92  The 
trio then expanded their target states, changed the name of their organization to 
“Americans for Medical Rights,” and placed parallel initiatives on the ballots of five 
other states.93  A spokesman for “Americans for Medical Rights” stated that its “goal 
is to change national policy, but we know we will have to win more battles in the 
states in 1998, 1999, and 2000 before that happens.”94
                                                                
88Id.
89See SECRETARY OF STATE, supra note 3. In order for the amendment to appear on the 
ballot, the proponents had to meet the procedures laid out in the constitution.  They submitted 
the Initiative proposal to the Attorney General together with a summary of the proposal.  Once 
the Attorney general approved the summary as a fair and accurate description of the proposal, 
the proponents circulated the summary and solicited the signatures of registered voters.  The 
proponents needed to gather 10% of the votes cast in the last gubernatorial election, which 
according to the Secretary of State, Kenneth Blackwell, was ~335,000. See Secretary of State, 
Kenneth Blackwell, Official election results, (1998).  The coalition secured over twice that 
amount. See Sandy Theis, New Tactic Pushed in War on Drugs, THE PLAIN DEALER, August 
8, 2002, at A1.  The amount of signatures needed for a constitutional amendment initiative 
(10%) is much greater than the amount needed for a statutory initiative (3%). 
90 ISSUE 1: THE OHIO DRUG TREATMENT INITIATIVE, at
http://www.state.oh.us/sos/ISSUE1_TEXT_2002.htm (last revisited on Jan. 17, 2004) (on file 
with author).  The Constitution provides that the Secretary of State shall be one of a five-
member Ohio Ballot Board committee to write the language of the title and summary for the 
ballot. See OHIO CONST. art. XVI, § 1. 
91See BRODER, supra note 35, at 191. 
92Id.
93Id.  Those states are Alaska, Colorado, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington.  Id. But cf.
Alan Johnson, Issue 1 Debate Highlights Gulf between Viewpoints, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH,
Oct. 31, 2002 at C3 (indicating the trio has had success in backing 17 of 19 drug reform 
initiatives in other states).   
94See BRODER, supra note 35, at 192. 
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In Arizona for the 1996 election, the organization staged a much broader attack 
on the drug laws.  There the initiative, a statute entitled “Drug Medicalization, 
Prevention, and Control Initiative,” was approved almost two-to-one. 95   That 
measure, in part, provided that the first two convictions for drug possession would 
result in probation and require the offender to participate in a drug treatment or 
education program.96  In 2000, a similar statute was passed in California, Proposition 
36.97  The organization then turned its attention to Ohio.  The Initiative and its goals 
mimic the Arizona and California statutes. 
The Ohio Initiative contained over 6,400 words.98  The Ohio Constitution itself 
has a little over 35,000 words.99  Thus, it would have expanded the Constitution by 
over 18%.  The Proposal sought to amend the constitution by adding section 24 to 
Article IV.  It included twelve sections100 and numerous subsections. 
The first section entitled, “Intents and Purposes,” read like propaganda 
supporting treatment as a cure for the drug problem in Ohio.  The intent of the 
Initiative was to break the cycle of drug use, halt the wasteful expenditure of millions 
of dollars each year, provide substance abuse treatment and rehabilitation programs, 
make qualified professionals responsible for treatment and supervision of alleged 
offenders, and maintain existing prevention efforts in Ohio.101
The Initiative laid out strict guidelines for courts to follow when trying 
defendants charged with possession or use of a controlled substance.  An offender 
charged with, or convicted of, illegal possession or use would be entitled to request 
treatment in lieu of jail time.102  At that time the court would be mandated to stay all 
criminal proceedings and determine if the offender met the eligibility guidelines set 
out in sections (C)(1)(a)-(d) or (C)(2).103  Section (C)(3) is a catch-all clause that 
                                                                
95Id.
96Id. at 193.  See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-901.01 (2002).  Interestingly, the Arizona statute 
is 497 words long, and the California statute has 2,085 words. 
97See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210.1 (Deering 2003). 
98See INITIATIVE, supra note 90.
99See generally OHIO CONST.  The Ohio Constitution is longer and more detailed than the 
United States Constitution and has its own structure. See LSC MEMBERS’ BRIEF, supra note 
45, at 2.  
100The sections are: Intents and Purposes; Treatment Motion, Hearing and Assessment; 
Eligibility for Treatment; Treatment Plan; Modification of Treatment Plan at Treatment 
Provider’s Initiation; Modification of Treatment Plan at Independent Monitor’s Initiation; 
Program Violations, Consequences, Increased Level of Care, Removal from Treatment Plan; 
Drug Related Violations; Completion of Program, Benefits, Limitations; Funding for 
Treatment; Limited Scope of Treatment Right; Definitions; Effective Date.  See generally
INITIATIVE, supra note 90. 
101See INITIATIVE, supra note 90, at (A). 
102Id. at (B)(1). 
103Id. at (B)(2).  The requirements for eligibility are as follows: 
A first or second-time offender shall be eligible for treatment if the court finds all of 
the following: 
(a) The offender is charged with illegal possession or use of a controlled 
substance:
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would have given the court discretion to order treatment if the offender had been 
convicted of certain non-violent felonies in addition to possession or use.104  The 
court would have had the option of making an eligibility determination with or 
without a hearing within three days of the request.105  If the court determined the 
offender was not eligible without conducting a separate hearing, the offender could 
request a hearing.  The court would have had additional time in which to hold the 
hearing. The proposal allowed a total of sixteen days from the time of initial request 
for treatment to a final determination of eligibility if the offender requests a 
hearing.106  If the offender met the eligibility requirements, the court then would have 
been required to send the offender to treatment and secure a treatment contract and 
confidentiality waiver from the offender.107  If at any time the offender withdrew a 
                                                          
106Id. at (B)(2)-(3). 
(b) The offender has not been convicted of or imprisoned for a violent felony 
within five years of committing the current offense: 
(c) The offender has not been sentenced to a term of incarceration that would 
interfere with the offender’s participation in the treatment plan; and, 
(d) In the same proceeding, the offender has not been convicted of and does not 
have pending charges for: 
(i) Any felony other than illegal possession or use offense, or any 
misdemeanor involving theft, violence or the threat of violence; 
(ii) An offense of trafficking, sale or manufacture of controlled substances;  
(iii) An offense of possession of controlled substances with the intent or for 
the purpose of trafficking, sale or manufacture of controlled substances; 
or,
(iv) An offense of illegally operating a motor vehicle under the influence of 
alcohol or a controlled substance. 
A repeat offender shall be eligible for treatment of the court finds both of the 
following:
(a) The offender satisfies all of the eligibility requirements of division (C)(1)(a)-
(d) of this section; and, 
(b) The requested treatment is in the best interests of the offender and the public. 
Id. at (C)(1), (2). 
104See INITIATIVE, supra note 90, at (C)(3). 
(C)(3) If an offender does not qualify under division (C)(1) of this section solely due 
to the offender’s failure to satisfy the eligibility requirement of division 
(C)(1)(d)(i) of this section, the offender may nonetheless be found eligible for 
treatment if the court finds all of the following: 
(a) The Offense or offenses do not include a violent felony or any misdemeanor 
involving violence or the threat of violence; 
(b) The offense or offenses resulted from the offender’s drug abuse or addiction: 
(c) Treatment of the individual is in the best interests of the offender and the 
public; and 
(d) The individual has not been proved to pose a danger to the safety of other 
persons.
Id.
105See INITIATIVE, supra note 90, at (B)(3). 
107See INITIATIVE, supra note 90, at (B)(4). 
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request for treatment, the court would have been limited to sentencing the offender to 
a maximum of ninety days in jail.108
The Initiative then laid out the plan for treatment.  A “qualified treatment 
professional” would have assessed the offender, devised an individualized treatment 
plan and monitored the treatment.109  To be eligible for probationary treatment, the 
offender needed to consent to the plan.  Treatment would normally last no longer 
than twelve or eighteen months depending on how much time the treatment 
professional or court felt was necessary.110  Additionally, at the treatment provider or 
independent monitor’s discretion, the treatment plan could be modified to suit the 
offender’s ongoing treatment needs.111
The Initiative also addressed the consequences for voluntary discharge or 
violations of the treatment plan.  The offender, if removed from treatment for any 
reason, would have been sentenced to a maximum of ninety days in prison or  
required to perform community service.112
The remainder of the section detailed the court’s authority to alter the plan or 
sanction the offender.113  If the time line for treatment had expired and the offender 
did not satisfactorily complete the treatment program, the Initiative permitted the 
court to modify the plan or dismiss the proceedings and release the offender, but was 
not permitted to incarcerate him/her.114  After the completion of treatment, whether 
successful or not, the offender had the option of filing a motion to seal the records 
and expunge the conviction.115
The Initiative imposed huge costs by requiring strict adherence to treatment in 
lieu of incarceration. In conjunction with requiring additional costs in both court 
proceedings and treatment programs, the Initiative also provided a mechanism for 
funding the program.   
The Initiative allocated $19 million in 2003 and $38 million for each year 
through 2009. This money, taken from the General Revenue Fund, would be used to 
create a Substance Abuse Treatment Fund (“SATF”).116  The proposal specified that 
the funds allocated to the SATF could not be used to supplant current funding for 
prevention and education.117  It proposed to set up an agency to dispense funds and 
set specific guidelines for communities wishing to utilize the funds.118  It designated 
                                                                
108Id. at (B)(4)(b). 
109 Id. at (D)(1)-(4).  This “qualified treatment personnel” would have remained the 
offender’s monitor even if she or he was not the actual treatment provider.  Id.
110Id. at (D)(9). 
111Id. at (E), (F). 
112See INITIATIVE, supra note 90, at (G)(1). 
113Id. at (G)(2)-(3). 
114Id. at (H)(1)-(3). 
115Id. at (H)(4)-(6). 
116See INITIATIVE, supra note 90, at (I)(4).  The proposal does not mention funding for any 
years after 2009. See id.
117Id. at (I)(5). 
118Id. at (I)(1), (2). 
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85% of the SATF to fund programs and treatment plans for eligible offenders.119  The 
remaining 15% of the fund would be used to pay for the costs of administering the 
funds and monitoring its success.120
In addition to addressing the court procedures and funding, the Initiative was 
complete in that it (1) set out applicable constitutional principles; (2) set out the 
standard of proof for court proceedings;121  (3) specified the intent of the people in 
enacting the amendment;122 (4) included a limited section of definitions for terms;123
and (5) specified an effective date.124
IV. ANALYSIS
A.  Comparison to Current Drug Treatment Policies 
The majority of critics of the proposed Initiative maintained that the drug 
treatment issue would be better dealt with as a statute rather than an amendment to 
the constitution.125 Ohio Revised Code section 2951.041 currently addresses drug 
treatment in lieu of incarceration.126  Section 2951.041 was predicated by section 
2951.04 which was repealed in 1996.127  Section 2951.041 has been amended several 
times since its counterpart’s repeal.128  While Initiative was modeled after the statute, 
the two were similar and different in several fundamental ways.129
Both documents provide for evaluation by qualified personnel to determine if an 
offender is eligible for treatment instead of incarceration.130  The statute, similar to 
the Initiative, has a provision which gives the court recourse in the event that the 
                                                                
119Id. at (I)(8). 
120That equates to $2,850,000 in 2003 and $5,700,000 in subsequent years. 
121See, e.g., INITIATIVE, supra note 90, at (G)(2)(a) “preponderance of the evidence” and 
(b) “clear and convincing evidence.”  Id.
122See id. at (A). 
123See id. at (K). 
124See id. at (L). 
125See Justice Tomas J. Moyer & Justice Alice Robie Resnick, Letter to Peter Lewis, 
George Soros, & John Sperling, at http://www.nationalfamilies.org/guide/ohiossc.htm (last 
revisited on Feb. 28, 2003) (on file with author); Ted Wendling, Hope Taft was Key to Defeat 
of Issue 1, THE PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 11, 2002, at B1 (reporting the opposition’s focus on the 
theme of the inappropriateness of the measure being a constitutional amendment). 
126OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2951.041 (Anderson 2002). 
127See id.  Section 2951.041 was enacted at the same time as the repeal of section 2951.04 
in 1996.  It was itself repealed in its entirety in 2000 and replaced by the current version of 
section 2951.041.  See § 2951.041 history. 
128Id.
129The Initiative was 6,400 words in length and the statute is 1,550 words.  This difference 
flows against the norm that constitutional provisions are shorter and more general than 
statutes.  The statute is entitled “Intervention in lieu of Conviction.”  It defines this as “any 
court supervised activity that complies with this section.”  § 2951.041(G)(2). 
130See INITIATIVE, supra note 90, at (B)(5); § 2951.041(B)(5). 
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treatment is later determined to be unnecessary or ineffective.   It also provides 
measures in the event the offender becomes a disciplinary problem. 
Both the statute and the Initiative address offenders who successfully complete 
the treatment program.  Both allow a defendant’s records to be sealed.  The statute 
provides, “[s]uccessful completion of the intervention plan and period of abstinence 
under this section shall be without adjudication of guilt and is not a criminal 
conviction for purposes of any disqualification or disability imposed by law and 
upon conviction of a crime, and the court may order the sealing of records related to 
the offense in question.”131  The Initiative sets out that “[i]f the court so finds [that 
the offender successfully completed treatment] . . . the court shall, . . . order the 
sealing of records related to the offender’s charge or conviction for illegal possession 
or use of a controlled substance, and expunge any conviction.”132
Just as there are several similarities, there are also many differences between 
Section 2951.041 and the Initiative.  The statute provides that a court may accept an 
offender’s request for intervention in lieu of conviction.133  Such a request must be 
made prior to entering a plea.134  The court may consider or reject the request with or 
without a hearing.135   If the court accepts the request, it must stay all criminal 
proceedings and conduct a separate hearing to determine whether the offender is 
eligible for treatment in lieu of incarceration.136
The statute has nine requirements for eligibility on its face 137  and multiple 
additional restrictions on eligibility by reference to other code sections.138  To be 
                                                                
131§ 2951.041(E). 
132See INITIATIVE, at (H)(4).
133See § 2951.04 at (A)(1) (emphasis added). 
134Id.   
135See id.
136See id.
137 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2951.041 (B)(1)-(9) (Anderson 2002).  The nine 
requirements are: 
(B) An offender is eligible for intervention in lieu of conviction if the court finds all of 
the following: 
(1) The offender previously has not been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a 
felony, previously has not been through intervention in lieu of conviction 
under this section or any similar regimen, and is charged with a felony for 
which the court, upon conviction, would impose sentence under division 
(B)(2)(b) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code or with a misdemeanor.  
(2) The offense is not a felony of the first, second, or third degree, is not an 
offense of violence, is not a violation of division (A)(1) or (2) of section 
2903.06 of the Revised Code, is not a violation of division (A)(1) of section 
2903.08 of the Revised Code, is not a violation of division (A) of section 
4511.19 of the Revised Code or a municipal ordinance that is substantially 
similar to that division, and is not an offense for which a sentencing court is 
required to impose a mandatory prison term, a mandatory term of local 
incarceration, or a mandatory term of imprisonment in a jail.  
(3) The offender is not charged with a violation of section 2925.02, 2925.03, 
2925.04, or 2925.06 of the Revised Code and is not charged with a violation 
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eligible, the prosecutor in the case must recommend that the offender be classified as 
eligible for intervention in lieu of conviction.139   Presently, under the code, an 
offender is not eligible if she or he has a prior prison sentence140 or prior treatment in 
lieu of incarceration.141
Under current law, if the offender is eligible for treatment, a court has the option 
of suspending the sentence and placing the person on probation under the control of 
the county probation department.  The Initiative differed in this respect.  It did not 
give the court discretion in sentencing.  The Initiative provided that “[n]o offender 
found to be eligible for treatment and entitled to such release shall be sentenced to a 
term of incarceration unless and until the offender is removed from treatment 
                                                          
of section 2925.11 of the Revised Code that is a felony of the first, second, or 
third degree.  
(4) The offender is not charged with a violation of section 2925.11 of the Revised 
Code that is a felony of the fourth degree, or the offender is charged with a 
violation of that section that is a felony of the fourth degree and the prosecutor 
in the case has recommended that the offender be classified as being eligible 
for intervention in lieu of conviction under this section.
(5) The offender has been assessed by an appropriately licensed provider, certified 
facility, or licensed and credentialed professional, including, but not limited 
to, a program licensed by the department of alcohol and drug addiction 
services pursuant to section 3793.11 of the Revised Code, a program certified 
by that department pursuant to section 3793.06 of the Revised Code, a public 
or private hospital, the United States department of veterans affairs, another 
appropriate agency of the government of the United States, or a licensed 
physician, psychiatrist, psychologist, independent social worker, professional 
counselor, or chemical dependency counselor for the purpose of determining 
the offender's eligibility for intervention in lieu of conviction and 
recommending an appropriate intervention plan. 
(6) The offender's drug or alcohol usage was a factor leading to the criminal 
offense with which the offender is charged, intervention in lieu of conviction 
would not demean the seriousness of the offense, and intervention would 
substantially reduce the likelihood of any future criminal activity. 
(7) The alleged victim of the offense was not sixty-five years of age or older, 
permanently and totally disabled, under thirteen years of age, or a peace 
officer engaged in the officer's official duties at the time of the alleged 
offense.
(8) If the offender is charged with a violation of section 2925.24 of the Revised 
Code, the alleged violation did not result in physical harm to any person, and 
the offender previously has not been treated for drug abuse. 
(9) The offender is willing to comply with all terms and conditions imposed by 
the court pursuant to division (D) of this section. 
Id.
138See id.  Some restrictions in section 2929.13(B)(1) exclude offenders who caused or 
attempted to cause harm to others with or without a firearm, certain sex offenses, offenders 
who hold public office, and those who were previously sentenced to prison or are on 
probation.  See § 2929.13.  
139§ 2951.041(B)(4). 
140See § 2929.13(B)(1).   
141See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2951.041(B)(8) (Anderson 2002). 
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. . . .”142 Courts would have had to send eligible offenders to treatment instead of 
prison. 
The Initiative, in contrast, did not give the court the option of accepting or 
rejecting a request for treatment.  The Initiative provided that upon receiving a 
request for treatment the court shall stay the proceedings and determine whether the 
offender meets eligibility requirements.143  Unlike the statute, the Initiative allowed a 
defendant to make a request for treatment at any point during the criminal 
proceedings, including post-sentencing.144
The Initiative had more lenient requirements for eligibility.145  The Initiative did 
not reject offenders who had prior records or who had received prior drug 
treatment. 146   In fact the Initiative specifically included first and second-time 
offenders as well as repeat offenders.147
Other differences between the present statute and the Initiative include drug 
testing and funding for the program.  The statute mandates drug testing for at least 
one year after the successful completion of treatment.148  The Initiative on the other 
hand, does not mention drug testing except in its intents and purposes section.149  The 
statute does not provide a source of funds or an agency to distribute and oversee the 
treatment programs while the Initiative establishes a comprehensive funding 
program.150  The statute does not lay out its intents and purposes.  In fact, it would be 
extremely difficult for a fact finder to determine the General Assembly’s intent in 
enacting section 2951.041.151
The Initiative was under inclusive in addressing how drug use relates to other 
crimes.  It did not address those criminals whose behavior was actually linked to 
drug use.  The Initiative only spoke to drug users and possessors.  It was at the same 
time over inclusive by maintaining that all drug users and possessors need treatment.  
The reality is that there are many unfortunate people who dabble with drugs who 
                                                                
142Id. at (B)(4)(b). 
143See INITIATIVE supra note 90, at (B)(2) (emphasis added). 
144This can be implied from language elsewhere in the Initiative.  There are different 
consequences if prior to treatment an offender had been or had not been convicted of the 
possession or use charge.  See id. at (G)(1)(a), (b).  
145See INITIATIVE, supra note 90. 
146See id. at (C)(1), (2). 
147Id.
148See § 2951.041(E).  “The terms and conditions of the intervention plan shall require the 
offender, for at least one year from the date on which the court grants the order of intervention 
in lieu of conviction, to abstain from the use of illegal drugs and alcohol and to submit to 
regular random testing for drug and alcohol use.”  Id.
149See INITIATIVE, supra note 90, at (A)(5).  It states, “to ensure that drug testing is used as 
a treatment tool . . . .”  Id.
150Id. at (I).  
151There is no record of the debates on any of the changes made to the statute.  The reason 
for changing the statute was to make it clearer.  See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2951.041 
(Anderson 2002). 
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would never undertake further criminal behavior.  If the Initiative was truly 
concerned with the effects that drug use had on crime, it would have fully addressed 
the circumstances in which a crime and drug use were linked. 
The statute, by contrast, provides a more comprehensive cure for the link 
between drugs and crime by allowing a treatment option for all “probationary” 
crimes.  However, this cure was reactionary in nature because it only addressed drug 
dependency when it resulted in crime.  The Initiative was more proactive by 
allowing intervention in the form of treatment at the early stages of drug use before it 
leads to increased criminal behavior.152
Proponents of the Initiative utilized current law when fashioning the language of 
the measure making them seem similar. 153   However, the two documents very 
quickly diverged substantively and procedurally.  The Initiative mandated court 
acceptance of a request for treatment.  It shortened the timeline and decreased the 
requirements for determining eligibility. It limited the length of prison sentence for 
use or possession to ninety days.  The Initiative provided funding for the program, 
while the statute left funding up to yearly budget fluctuations.  The two documents 
are fundamentally different in another way as well: the statute is easily modified, the 
Constitution is not. 
B.  Reasons Why the Initiative Failed 
The Initiative failed for several reasons.  Opposition to the measure was 
substantial, but ultimately, the Initiative itself was its greatest adversary.  Many 
citizens rejected it because of its language, length and effect.  “From a voter’s 
perspective, most initiatives cannot be relegated neatly into a ‘should be passed’ or 
‘should not be passed’ category.”154
1.  A Sizeable Opposition 
One significant reason the Initiative failed was the size and make-up of its 
opponents.155  Governor Bob Taft and his wife Hope Taft were decidedly against the 
proposed amendment.  Governor Taft, along with many law enforcement groups156
and judges157 supported the opposition group, Ohioans Against Unsafe Drug Laws.  
This organization was very vocal in its disdain of the Initiative and had many 
                                                                
152See INITIATIVE, supra note 90, at (A).  
153One of the purposes for the initiative process is inaction by the legislature or action 
against the desires of the people.  “It provides the people with the ability to compel legislative 
enactment when the state legislature has failed to pursue such a cause.”  See CHESLEY, supra
note 18, at 542.   
154See BRODER, supra note 35, at 73. 
155Outcomes of initiatives are influenced by the positions taken by prominent political and 
community leaders.  See DUBOIS supra note 63, at 188.  But cf. DEMOCRACY DERAILED at 181.
Governor Locke openly opposed an initiative that would end affirmative action in 
Washington.  It passed 58% to 42%.  Id.
156Ted Wendling, Voters Hand Huge Defeat to Issue 1 Drug Reform, PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 
6, 2002, at S1.  See also, Joel Moroney, Law Officials in Favor of Accountability, MANSFIELD
NEWS JOURNAL, Oct. 25, 2002, at 7A. 
157See Juvenile Judge Sees Issue 1 as Effort, NEWS-MESSENGER, Oct. 24, 2002, at A10. 
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arguments against the Initiative.158  They were also critical of the Initiative’s backers 
since they were not all Ohioians.159
Jack Ford, the Democratic mayor of Toledo was co-chairman of Ohioans Against 
Unsafe Drug Laws.  He relied on his experience as a former head of a drug treatment 
center to make the argument that the Initiative would allow drug offenders to receive 
treatment before those who may be in greater need of treatment.160  He also argued 
that there was a substantial lack of treatment centers in Ohio.161
First Lady Hope Taft, a nationally recognized expert in substance abuse 
treatment, argued that the Initiative was a step toward decriminalizing drug laws.162
She and the Governor stated that the Initiative would severely undermine the state’s 
well-regarded drug courts. 163   In drug courts, which exist in only twenty-five 
counties, treatment is mandatory and successful defendants can have their records 
expunged.  The Tafts maintained that these courts already successfully address the 
Initiative’s goals.164
Key to the Taft and Toledo mayor’s opposition was the fact that arguments 
against the Initiative as an amendment to the constitution resonated with the 
“informed opposition – primarily elected officials and newspaper editorial 
writers.”165  It was these editorial writers that made up a large part of the media’s 
scope of coverage. 
The stance by treatment providers was conflict-ridden.  Many drug treatment 
providers came out against the Initiative by stating that treatment is unsuccessful 
without the underlying threat of incarceration.166  On the other hand, some treatment 
providers publicly supported the Initiative claiming that those who were against it 
                                                                
158See Historical Election Data for the General Election Nov. 5, 2002: Arguments Against 
State Issue 1, at http://serform.sos.state.oh.us/sos/results/index.html (last revisited Jan. 17, 
2004) (on file with author). 
159Kristy Eckert, Issue One Backers Detail Costs in Bid for Ballot, DAYTON DAILY NEWS,
Sept. 4, 2002.  While the initial list of three millionaires contained only one Ohioan, they were 
joined by a second, Richard Wolfe a Columbus native who now resides in California.  Wolf 
previously served as chairman of the Franklin County Alcohol, Drug and Mental Health 
Services Board.  He contributed $200,000 to the campaign.  See id.
160Jack Ford, Drug Initiative is a Dangerous, Unfair Policy, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 
20, 2002, at B4. 
161Id.
162Sandy Theis, New Tactic Pushed in War on Drugs, PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 8, 2002, at A1.  
See also, Ted Wendling, Hope Taft was Key to Defeat of Issue 1, PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 11, 
2002, at B1. 
163See NEW TACTIC, supra note 162.   
164See TAFT WAS KEY, supra note 162. Hope Taft felt that “[i]t was more effective to point 
out . . . how a constitutional amendment wasn’t going to work in Ohio and how we were 
already doing what they said they wanted to do.”  Id. 
165Id. See also, HUGE DEFEAT, supra note 156 (reporting that it was a mistake to propose 
the drug initiative as an amendment to the constitution). 
166See Alan Johnson, Issue 1 Isn’t the Answer, Say Some Drug Counselors, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Oct. 10, 2002 at C3. 
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were pressured to say so.167  Their claim was that current funding for their treatment 
programs would be cut if they did not come out against the Initiative.168  Treatment 
provider Sandra Stephenson said, it’s “clear that some of Ohio’s treatment providers 
are not free to speak their minds about Issue 1.  We know that a significant number 
of treatment providers support Issue 1.”169  The majority of treatment providers, 
however, were vocally against the Initiative. 
The opposition to the Initiative had a snowball effect.  Early polls showed that 
the Initiative had the support of sixty-percent of voters.170  In late October, however, 
the opposition began to gain members, and by Election Day, the opposition had 
placed numerous television ads, newspaper articles and editorials in front of the 
public.  Mervin Field, a public opinion expert explains the impact of such an 
opposition: 
Typically, the public only becomes fully aware of the opposition to the 
measure relatively late in the campaign, sometimes only a few weeks 
before Election Day.  Then, if the force and extent of opposition to the 
proposal are considerable, public awareness of the measure increases 
dramatically.  And more times than not the original instinctive support of 
the idea is replaced by a negative view.171
The Proponents agreed that the opposition was a crucial cause of the Initiative’s 
defeat.  “We didn’t expect to run into a million dollars in opposition expenditures . . . 
This governor and this first lady took this much more personally than anyone in 
leadership in any of the other states that we’ve worked in.” 172   Because the 
opposition was so strong the few weeks before the election, much of the public’s 
exposure to the Initiative’s merits was from a negative perspective.   
2.  The Ballot 
One possible reason for the Initiative’s failure was the ballot itself.  Many times, 
a difference in the location and language on the ballot may have returned a different 
result.  Proponents do not have control over either the placement or language of the 
measure.  The Ohio ballot board writes the ballot caption and summary,173 and the 
Secretary of State determines the placement of issues on the ballot.174  In Ohio, many 
                                                                
167Id.
168Id.
169Id.
170SurveyUSA. “If the election were today, and you were standing in the voting booth 
right now, would you vote yes or would you vote no on Issue 1?  60 % “Yes” 38 % “No.”  
Taft, Issue 1 Win according to New Poll (WKYC-TV Oct. 21, 2002); SurveyUSA: Taft atop 
Hagan by 7; Surprising Strength for Issue #1(WKYC-TV Oct. 21, 2002). 
171See BRODER, supra note 35, at 84.
172See HUGE DEFEAT, supra note 156. 
173See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3505.062 (Anderson 2002). 
174OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3519.12 (Anderson 2002).  See also, State ex rel. Williams v. 
Brown, 368 N.E.2d 838 (Ohio 1977).  
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measures have unintended results because the effect of a vote is unclear.175  Not 
surprisingly, the ballot can make or break a measure.   
Although Ohio does not require the ballot to state the effect of a yes or no vote, 
which generates voter confusion,176 this was not the case with the Initiative.  The 
ballot title for the Initiative stated, “To adopt Section 24 of Article IV of the 
Constitution of the State of Ohio [text of ballot summary] Shall the proposed 
amendment be adopted?” 177   This language clearly indicated the effect of an 
affirmative vote.  A “yes” vote would amend the constitution and a “no” vote would 
reject the proposal.  
The Initiative was located on the last page of the ballot following all other 
candidates and local issues.  Studies have shown that a five to fifteen-percent drop-
off in voter participation is common in state elections. 178   A drop-off is the 
percentage of voters who come to the polls but fail to vote on candidates or proposals 
found lower on the ballot.179  If the issue had been located higher up on the ballot 
more voters would have considered the proposal.   
Both the measure’s proponents and opponents agree “that putting the cost in the 
ballot’s first paragraph doomed the measure.”180  The Ohio ballot board has the 
responsibility of writing the ballot language for measures. 181   Proponents of an 
initiative may reject the ballot language if it misleads the voters.182  When the Ohio 
                                                                
175See DUBOIS, supra note 63, at 118.  “Voter surveys of [Ohio] elections involving three 
different initiatives—a 1972 initiative to repeal a recently adopted income tax, a 1977 
initiative to repeal Election Day registration and an initiative to repeal tax increases adopted in 
1983—showed that in each election 25 to 30 percent of the voters voted opposite to their own 
policy preference.”  Id. (quoting Herb Asher, “Voter Confusion in Initiative Elections,” paper 
presented at the 1989 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, 
Georgia.). Wouldn’t it be an interesting initiative to propose a law that would make sure there 
is no voter confusion of the effect of a yes vote? 
176Id. at 120. 
177Secretary of State, Kenneth Blackwell, Issue 1 Ballot Language for the November 5, 
2002 General Election, at http://serform.sos.state.oh.us/sos/results/index.html (last revisited 
Jan. 17, 2004) (on file with author). 
178See also JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, THE INITIATIVE: CITIZEN LAW-MAKING, 172 (1999).  
“The falloff in the number of votes cast on propositions if they appear at the end of the ballot 
or bottom of the voting machine in comparison with votes for candidates at the top of the 
ballot strongly suggests that initiated propositions be placed at the top of the ballot before the 
listing of the names of candidates for elective office.”  Id.
179See CRONIN, supra note 15.
180See TAFT WAS KEY, supra note 162.  See BALLOT LANGUAGE infra note 183, at first 
paragraph. 
181See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3505.062 (Anderson 2002).  The ballot language for such 
proposed amendments shall be prescribed by a majority of the Ohio Ballot Board, consisting 
of “the Secretary of State and four appointed members. No more than two of the appointed 
members shall be of the same political party.”  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3505.061 (Anderson 
2002).
182OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3519.12 (Anderson 2002). 
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ballot board wrote the ballot language for the Initiative, 183 the proponents did not 
initially object to it.184  Objections came later when proponents began to feel that the 
                                                                
183The ballot read: 
In order to provide for persons charged with or convicted of illegal 
possession or use of a drug, in certain circumstances, to choose treatment 
instead of incarceration, to require the state to spend two hundred forty-
seven million dollars ($247,000,000) over seven (7) fiscal years to pay for 
the drug treatment programs, to allow the applicable records of offenders 
who complete treatment instead of incarceration for illegal drug use and 
possession to be sealed and kept confidential for most purposes, and to 
limit the maximum sentence to ninety (90) days incarceration that eligible 
first-time, second-time, and certain repeat illegal drug possession or use 
offenders could serve, this amendment would: 
1. Require a court to order treatment instead of incarceration for first-
time or second-time offenders charged with or convicted of illegal 
possession or use of a drug who request treatment, have not been convicted 
of or imprisoned for a violent felony within five years of committing the 
current offense, have not been sentenced to a term of incarceration that 
would interfere with participation in treatment, and in the same proceeding 
have not been convicted of or charged with other drug-related offenses or 
misdemeanors involving theft, violence or the threat of violence.
2. Allow a court to order treatment instead of incarceration for eligible 
repeat offenders charged with or convicted of illegal possession or use of a 
drug who request treatment, and for offenders charged with or convicted of 
illegal possession or use of a drug who are also charged with or convicted 
of other nonviolent offenses resulting from drug abuse or addiction and 
who request treatment. 
3. Create a Substance Abuse Treatment Fund and require the state to 
spend a total of two hundred and forty-seven million dollars 
($247,000,000) to pay for the treatment, breaking down to nineteen million 
dollars ($19,000,000) for the remainder of the 2003 fiscal year and thirty-
eight million dollars ($38,000,000) annually through fiscal year 2009, in 
addition to requiring the state to maintain its current spending to fund 
existing substance abuse treatment programs through fiscal year 2009, and 
to require the state to continue to provide adequate resources for these 
purposes after fiscal year 2009. 
4. Limit the period of treatment a court may impose to not more than 
twelve (12) months, allow an extension of the treatment period for not 
more than six (6) more months, and allow court supervision of an offender 
for up to ninety (90) days after treatment. 
5. Limit the sentencing of first-time, second-time, and certain repeat 
offenders who are eligible for treatment but who either do not request 
treatment or do not meet the terms of the treatment to a maximum of 
ninety  (90) days incarceration for illegal possession or use of a drug. 
6. Limit the authority of judges who place eligible offenders into 
treatment to remove those offenders from the programs. 
7. Require a court to dismiss legal proceedings against an offender 
without a finding of guilt if the offender completes the treatment. 
8. Allow an offender who successfully completes the treatment to have 
applicable records sealed and to have the conviction that prompted the 
request for treatment expunged, and require that the sealed or expunged 
records be kept confidential except for specified law enforcement and 
court related purposes. 
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opposition was corrupt.185  Seeing a dollar amount in the first line of the summary, 
many voters who were unfamiliar with the Initiative may have felt that it proposed a 
tax increase.186  This language, alone, may have defeated the Initiative, as voters are 
very reluctant to raise taxes.187
3.  The Initiative was an Amendment to the Ohio Constitution 
Some critics of the Initiative argued that the issue belongs in the General 
Assembly, not the state constitution.188  Sources from the “Americans for Medical 
Rights” indicated that because of the post enactment legislative tinkering of the 
similar statute in Arizona,189 it decided to effectuate changes in Ohio laws through 
amendment to the constitution rather than statute.190  One alternative to this scenario 
could have been to propose the Initiative as a statute and include a provision 
restricting legislative tinkering until two or more years after enactment as the 
initiative in Arizona did191  or requiring a higher percentage of the votes in the 
                                                          
 If adopted, provisions of this amendment related to funding for the 
remainder of fiscal year 2003 will be effective immediately; otherwise this 
amendment will be effective July 1, 2003, and will apply to all qualifying 
charges, convictions and criminal sentences pending before the court from 
that day forward. 
See BALLOT LANGUAGE, supra note 177. 
184Alan Johnson, Taft Upsets Issue 1 Backers, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 15, 2002, at B1. 
185Id.
186See HUGE DEFEAT, supra note 156.
187See TAFT WAS KEY, supra note 162. 
188Kristy Eckert & William Hershey, Drug Policy Backers May Make Ballot, DAYTON 
DAILY NEWS, Aug. 7, 2002.  
189See BRODER, supra note 35, at 194-96.  Shortly after the 1996 enactment, the Arizona 
legislature passed two bills that seriously undermines the new law.  One called for the full 
prison sentence for those defendants that refused treatment, and the other suspended medical 
use of an of the 117 drugs until they were approved by the Food and drug Administration (an 
unlikely occurrence). In response to this legislation, the coalition changed its name to “The 
People Have Spoken Coalition,” and they succeeded in passing a referendum vote effectively 
blocking the two laws.  In addition to the referendum, they succeeded in getting an initiative 
passed that limited legislative action on voter-approved measures to allow only minor 
technical changes by a three-fourths majority.  See id. See also ZIMMERMAN, supra note 179,
at 114-15. 
190See TAFT WAS KEY, supra note 162.  This has been cited as one of the reasons that, in 
Ohio, proponents seek constitutional amendments rather than statutes.  See DUBOIS, supra note 
63. See also, Philip Bentley, Armatta v. Kitzhaber: A New Test Safeguarding the Oregon 
Constitution from Amendment by Initiative, 78 Or. L. Rev. 1139 (claiming this phenomenon 
also affects Oregon initiative proponents).  Cf. DUBOIS, supra note 63, at 224 (maintaining that 
general experience is that legislatures are reluctant to change laws that were adopted by 
initiative).   
191As it is written, The Drug Treatment Initiative could not have been a statute.  It would 
have encountered issues of unconstitutionality.  The problem would have centered on the 
separation of powers doctrine.  A statute that violates the doctrine of separation of powers is 
unconstitutional.  The people of Ohio delegate their judicial power to the courts and expressly 
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General Assembly to change it.  The Initiative’s failure was predominantly due to the 
fact that it was a proposal to change the Ohio Constitution. 
A.  The Issue’s Length and Language 
“No American jurisdiction has gone as far in creating detailed and social 
entitlements in their constitutions as such countries as Brazil, Mexico, the former 
Soviet Union, or Haiti.  But some state constitutions are nearly as lengthy.”192  Many 
critics of the Initiative complained of its length.193  They maintained that the proposal 
was too lengthy for an amendment to the constitution.  “Like James Madison and 
Alexander Hamilton, the principal authors of the Federalist Papers, most modern 
commentators tend to favor a shorter, more basic constitution.”194  When a measure 
is lengthy, there is an immense possibility of voter confusion.  The proposed 
Initiative, at a length of 6,400 words, was far from short.  Claims were made that 
very few voters grasped the full understanding of the Initiative and its 
implications.195   
The proposed amendment was very wordy and had numerous redundant 
provisions.  For example, the phrase “[a]n offender declared eligible for treatment 
but who thus withdraws a request for treatment shall be sentenced, upon conviction, 
to up to ninety days of incarceration, or up to ninety days of confinement on a 
community-based corrections facility, for the illegal possession or use offense” is 
found twice exactly as quoted above and two more times in a minutely altered 
form.196  This redundancy added approximately 113 words to the Initiative.  Many 
other redundancies extended the language of the amendment by at least 520 words.197
                                                          
prohibit the Ohio General Assembly from exercising it. See OHIO CONST. art. IV, § I.  The 
Constitution limits legislative authority over the judicial power to set the rules and procedure 
of the courts of the state.  The general assembly shall not exercise any judicial power, not 
herein expressly conferred. OHIO CONST. art. II, § 32.  Article II, §1 extends this legislative 
restriction to the citizens and the initiative. “ In whom power vested - The limitations 
expressed in the constitution, on the power of the general assembly to enact laws, shall be 
deemed limitations on the power of the people to enact laws.”  OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1 The 
Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, which are promulgated by the Ohio Supreme Court pursuant to 
Ohio Const. art. IV, § 5(B), must control over subsequently enacted inconsistent statutes 
purporting to govern procedural matters. The State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. 
Sheward, 86 Ohio St. 3d 451, 478 (1999). 
The drug treatment Initiative as a statute would have mandated procedure in courts. 
It most likely would have been void by the Sheward court.  It would be interesting to see if the 
outcome would differ now that the composition of the court is different. 
192See DUBOIS, supra note 63, at 71-72. 
193Michael Meckler, Issue 1 showed danger looms in wordiness, COLUMBUS DISPATCH,
Nov. 6, 2002, at A19. 
194See DUBOIS, supra note 63, at 72.  The authors recommend that “most issues of 
everyday policy should be enacted as statutes, and that only matters of great principle should 
be embodied in constitutional form.”  Id. at 223.   
195See Ohio Drug Laws, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Oct. 6, 2002, at F2. 
196See INITIATIVE, supra note 90, at (B)(4)(b), (D)(8), (G)(1)(a), and (b).  
197See id. §§ (G)(3)(b)(ii) and (iii); §§(G)(2)(a) and (b); §§ (H)(1) and (2) and (4). 
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Another problem with the Initiative was that it was poorly written.  “A persistent 
complaint about initiative proposals is that many are poorly drafted . . . because they 
are poorly or ambiguously worded, or create strange effects because they ignore 
related legislation or conflict with another constitutional provision.”198  “Because 
legislative proposals are subject to public hearings and can be amended during the 
legislative process, constitutional amendments proposed by the legislature tend to be 
better drafted and more thoroughly debated and understood than those proposed by 
initiative.”199  Many proposals are poorly written and either do not get passed for that 
reason or do get passed and reek more havoc than good.200  “When these technical 
failures occur in a very long, highly complex initiative, there is a double effect.  Both 
the technical flaws and the potential for voter confusion increase geometrically.”201
When a voter is uncertain or confused about a measure, the likelihood of a “No” vote 
is very high. 
The Initiative’s language was extremely specific, which is a trait of a statute 
rather than an amendment.  It also had numerous clauses whose effects were unclear 
to readers.  While the Ohio constitutional amendment process does not require 
proponents to take their initiatives to the legislature for approval, this proposed 
amendment would have benefited from the machinery available for honing and 
structuring legislative action.  The Amendment would also have benefited from 
further public debates prior to its submission for signatures.202
B.  Ohioans Did Not Agree with the Moral Implications of the Initiative 
Ohioans do not take issues involving morality lightly.  Many of the reservations 
about the Initiative involved its moral implications.  With the Initiative posing a 
threat to the morals of society, even if that threat was misperceived, Ohioans rejected 
it rather than take the chance that it might succeed in rehabilitating drug users.    
Some felt that treatment would have let offenders off the hook.203
Opponents disagreed with the Initiative’s limited scope.204  The Ohio Medical 
Association (OMA) disapproved of the Initiative because it did not contain 
provisions for alcoholics and juveniles.205  They contended that many criminal acts 
are committed by people under the influence of alcohol.206  The OMA also believes 
                                                                
198See DUBOIS, supra note 63, at 113-14. 
199Id. at 76. 
200 California’s Proposition 13, which was the spark for modern-day initiatives, was 
drafted, unintentionally, to prevent the use of general obligation bonds by local governments.  
The poor drafting of the measure caused a loss in savings of over $250 million in seven years.  
DUBOIS supra note 63, at 157. 
201Id. at 112. 
202After which it cannot be amended. 
203 See Joel Moroney, Law Officials in Favor of Accountability, MANSFIELD NEWS 
JOURNAL, Oct. 25, 2002, at A7. 
204See FORD, supra note 160. 
205Ohio State Medical Association, at http://www.osma.org/legislation/state-issue-1.cfm 
(last revisited Aug. 26, 2003). 
206Id.
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that prevention of habitual drug use needs to start with our youth. 207   As the 
association recognizes the need for action addressing substance abuse, it may have 
approved the proposal had it contained provisions addressing these needs.  Mayor 
Jack Ford argued that in addition to neglecting alcohol addiction, the Initiative did 
not speak “of juveniles, even though most addictions begin in youth.”208
Opponents questioned the voluntariness of the program.209  Critics complained 
that if the Initiative were in place, offenders would fail in treatment because there 
was no threat of prison making them stay in treatment; the Initiative made treatment 
voluntary.210  “In voluntary drug treatment programs dropout rates are notoriously 
high.”211  The Initiative mandated that courts accept treatment as an alternative to 
sentencing for those who requested it.  While this appeared to make treatment 
voluntary for offenders, the proponents must have taken this into account when 
writing the substance of section G(1).212  If at any time the offender leaves treatment 
or if the court or other involved professionals determine treatment is not successful, 
the court must order an immediate prison sentence for the offender.  It is the threat of 
a prison term that keeps drug offenders in treatment.213  Contrary to critics beliefs, 
this threat was not absent from the Initiative. 
Controversy arose over the strict allocation of funding for the program.214  The 
Initiative provided a source of funding for the increase in treatment needs.  This 
funding however, became a hotly debated issue.  Some argued that Ohio is ranked 
“thirty-fifth . . . in per-capita drug treatment funding,” 215  and the funding was 
necessary.  They argued that the funding would be able to accommodate all persons 
currently in need of treatment yet forced to be on waiting lists.216
Opponents disliked a constitutional decree that allocated a minimum amount of 
the General Revenue Fund to treatment.  They claimed it gave a constitutional right 
to the Initiative over the budget needs of public health and safety, roads, economic 
development, education, and environmental protection. 217   It created a public 
                                                                
207Id.
208See FORD, supra note 160. 
209See SCHELLER, supra note 85; Beverly Young, Issue 1 is a Faulty, Dangerous Plan,
MARION STAR, Oct. 22, 2002, at A6. 
210See FORD supra note 160; See also JOHNSON, supra note 166.
211HENRY J. AARON AND CHARLES L. SCHULTZE, SETTING DOMESTIC PRIORITIES: WHAT 
CAN GOVERNMENT DO? 130 (1992). 
212See INITIATIVE, supra note 90, at G(1) (laying out the consequences for removal from 
treatment is prison sentence).  
213See JOHNSON, supra note 166. 
214See Ted Wendling, State Puts $112.6 Million Cost on Drug treatment Ballot Issue,
PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 29, 2002, at B5; Alan Johnson, Ad War on Issue 1 Under Way; 
Supporters of Proposal Say They Won't Attack Taft Now, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 19, 2002, 
at B1. 
215See WENDLING, supra note 214. 
216See id.
217See SCHELLER, supra note 85. 
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sentiment that drug treatment would become a priority over all other forms of public 
assistance.218  This troubled citizens at a time when threats of tax increases were 
being made to offset projected budget deficits.  Because the allocation from the 
General Revenue Fund was such a large sum of money, people voted against the 
Initiative fearing additional tax increases.219
Both sides disagreed with the policy of treatment instead of incarceration.  There 
were also debates over the number of offenders who would actually request 
treatment instead of jail time.  The opposition estimated 25% of offenders would 
actually choose treatment over incarceration, indicating that a large amount of 
offenders would chance receiving a maximum sentence of ninety days in prison 
rather than up to a year in treatment.220  Reasons for wanting a sentence shorter than 
the length of treatment may include family responsibilities and potential loss of 
employment.  Proponent Ed Orlett claimed that 90-95% of offenders would choose 
treatment.221  The reasons for selecting treatment could include: the need for help, 
concealment of a drug record, and avoiding prison.  Either way, the huge difference 
in estimates raises the question of how necessary the Initiative really was and how 
much money it would save. 
Many editorials published in major newspapers indicated that opponents felt the 
Initiative provided criminals with relief rather than punishment.222  This was the 
reason that many law enforcement groups opposed the Initiative.  Law enforcement 
officials were concerned that the Initiative would no longer hold drug offenders 
accountable for their behavior.223  They also expressed concern over the ability of 
criminal defense attorneys to find loopholes in the amendment that would generate 
endless, costly litigation.224  Sentiment against the Initiative also included a popular 
belief that treatment does not work and therefore, criminals would not feel the 
consequences of their behavior.  The fear that criminals would be released from 
treatment and be free to commit other crimes in support of their addictions 
compounded the sentiment.225   
The Initiative gave the option of treatment to users and possessors of “harder 
drugs.”226   While many people believe that marijuana possession is a low-level 
offense, this is not true of heroin and crack cocaine.227  The General Assembly has 
                                                                
218Id.
219See generally HUGE DEFEAT, supra note 156. 
220Gloria Gardner, author of Ohio’s Tax Department study on the Initiative, concluded that 
“25% of the defendants will choose incarceration over treatment because Issue 1 allows judges 
to impose no more than 90 days in jail.”  See COST, supra note 216. 
221See WENDLING, supra note 214. 
222See MORONEY, supra note 203. 
223Id.
224Id.
225See FORD, supra note 160. 
226See INITIATIVE supra note 90, at (K)(1). 
227 See ANDREW WEIL AND WINIFRED ROSEN, FROM CHOCOLATE TO MORPHINE:
EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT MIND-ALTERING DRUGS, 130 (1993). 
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codified this belief through harsher sentences for possessors of crack versus 
marijuana.228  The option of treatment for harder drug users did not bode well with 
some Ohioans causing them to reject the Initiative.  Other opponents claimed that 
this Initiative was the first step in legalizing marijuana.229
The Initiative proposed a change in social policy.  It generated a perception that it 
was lenient toward the crimes of drug use and possession.  Perhaps there is truth to 
Curt Steiner’s proposition, “I don’t think there’s a great nod in Ohio for making our 
drug laws more lenient. . . .  The idea of treatment instead of jail for truly low-level 
offenders has some appeal, but this issue was defeated because it was so much more 
than that.”230
C.  Application issues 
If The Ohio Drug Treatment Initiative had received a majority of votes in 
November, it would have created changes too numerous to count.  It would have had 
intended consequences that were the focus of much pre-election debate.  And it 
would have had many unintended consequences that were never addressed.  While 
the intended consequences were hotly controversial, the unintended ones could have 
been more so.  “Unintended consequences outnumber intended consequences.”231
The Initiative would have changed the way courts sentence non-violent offenders 
and most likely would have made the drug courts designed to handle such violators 
obsolete.  It would have given eligible offenders a constitutional right to treatment.  
The strict allocation of money from the budget would have been difficult to handle at 
first.  Once the system had been in place for a while the cost savings from reduced 
prison sentences might have neutralized this difficulty.  Non-violent drug offenders 
would have their cases stepped-up in order to comply with the time limit.  Offenders 
would have a constitutional right to seal or expunge their records making it possible 
to get a job. 
It is impossible to know for certain what else the Initiative would have affected.  
Many political theorists caution legislators and the public on the unintended 
consequences of statutory and constitutional enactments.232
[N]o policy choices are fraught with more peril in terms of unanticipated 
consequences than decisions to define or alter constitutions.  When 
constitutional change is formalized in the process and language of 
amendment, rather than the more malleable claims of judicial, executive, 
                                                                
228See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.13 (Anderson 2002). 
229See SCHELLER, supra note 85; Alan Johnson, Issue 1 Debate Highlights Gulf between 
Viewpoints, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 31, 2002, at C3 (claiming that the Initiative’s backers 
hijacked the rehabilitation and treatment issues to further their campaign of decriminalization). 
230See WENDLING, supra note 156. 
231 STEVEN M. GILLON, “THAT’S NOT WHAT WE MEANT TO DO:” REFORM AND ITS
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA, 21 (2000). 
232See id.; DAVID E. KYVIG, UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMEND-
MENT (2000).  The unintended consequences of liberal social legislation in the 1960s have 
contributed to a souring of the public mood and to a growing public cynicism about the 
possibility of change through politics.  GILLON, supra note 231, at 25.  This general cynicism 
may have also contributed to Initiative’s failure. 
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or legislative interpretation, the significance and risk of unintended 
outcomes escalate.  Once in place, a constitutional amendment becomes 
devilishly difficult to dislodge.233
While unintended consequences are not always forecasted, a few possibilities are 
put forth below. 
The language provides very detailed time limits for hearings.234  It clearly states 
that courts must act within three days to establish eligibility for a defendant.  With 
such specific protocol for procedure, courts would violate procedural due process 
whenever they were unable to determine eligibility of a defendant within that time.  
This time limit might lead courts to find some defendants eligible for treatment who 
should not be.  Alternatively, Courts may deem offenders ineligible within that first 
three-day period invoking the clause that affords defendants the right to a hearing on 
their eligibility.  This practice by the courts would lead to extra expenses in the form 
of attorney fees, court costs and court time. 
Early studies of California’s Proposition 36235 show that initial offenders had 
more serious addictions than anticipated and the state scrambled to opened more 
centers.236  Ohio would similarly rush to open more centers who are qualified to treat 
serious offenders.  Without an increase in capable and qualified treatment staff 
personnel, treatment centers would have been short staffed.  Quite possibly, 
treatment providers would have become monitored by a new state organization and 
state standards would have been created to mandate equality across the state. 
The public perception that clients of treatment centers are a threat to a 
neighborhood might have caused exoduses from areas that contain programs.  “It’s a 
great idea, just not in my backyard” syndrome may have become prevalent across the 
state.  Zoning changes might have been implemented to allow communities to 
restrict program development when faced with the possibility of a treatment center 
being built in their neighborhoods.   
Like many other legislative acts, the Initiative would have produced many 
consequences, desirable and undesirable.  Because the statutes in Arizona and 
California have only been recently been passed, it is too early to determine what 
some of the consequences might have been.237
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Amendment XVIII, Prohibition, adopted in 1919, was repealed by Amendment XXI in 1933, 
had numerous consequences.  Among the many unintended consequence of Prohibition were 
the growth of “bootleggers” and the creation of a police force to enforce the new laws.  See id.
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D.  The Permanency of an Amendment to the Constitution 
The Initiative was defeated in part because it “cements a huge, untested policy 
right into the Ohio Constitution.”238  If any of the Initiative’s consequences were 
undesirable, the General Assembly would have had difficulty in reconciling the 
problems.  As an amendment to the Ohio Constitution, the measure would have been 
permanent.  “Once a constitutional change is put into place, its removal presents an 
exceptional challenge.”239  The only way the Amendment could have been changed 
or abolished is by ratifying another constitutional amendment.  This would involve 
immense time and work on the part of legislators or citizen groups and would have to 
be put to the vote of the people for ratification.  The amount of time needed for 
making another amendment could have allowed for further damage to be inflicted. 
“A government [and the people] must be able to forecast rationally the situation 
that lies ahead in order to have any reasonable chance of dealing with it 
successfully.”240  Studies of California’s Proposition 36 show that it need tweaking.  
Proposition 36 is a law as opposed to Ohio’s Initiative.  The legislators in California 
can tweak and change the underlying code of Proposition 36.  Ohio could not have 
tweaked the Initiative if it had passed. 
V. CONCLUSION
The Ohio Drug Treatment Initiative failed for several reasons.  The incumbent 
governor backed the opposition.  The ballot language resulted in uncertainty as to the 
Initiative’s effect.  Finally, the Initiative’s length, language and substance are better 
suited as a statute rather than as an amendment to the constitution. 
The concept behind the proposal has been accepted by popular vote in Arizona 
and California.  There is even support for substantive reform of Ohio’s drug laws.  
Ohio would be well served to sit back and watch the laws of Arizona and California 
in place.  Ohio legislators and judges would benefit from seeing these laws in action, 
observing the flaws and strengths of drug treatment probation for first and second-
time offenders.  The General Assembly can then make decisions based on educated 
facts and data rather than ill-defined public opinion and fear.  If at that time, Ohio 
does not act, the public can again propose to mandate drug treatment for eligible 
offenders.  Next time, it should be done as a law rather than a constitutional 
amendment. 
TAMARA KAREL
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